ABSTRACT In order to improve the security performance of multiuser visible light communication (VLC) and facilitate the secure application of optical wireless communication technology in Internet-of-Things, we investigate the physical-layer security in a multiuser VLC system with non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA). When the light-emitting diode (LED) transmitter communicates with multiple legitimate users by downlink NOMA, both single eavesdropper and multi-eavesdropper scenarios are considered. In the presence of single eavesdropper, based on transmission characteristics of the optical wireless channel, with known instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of the NOMA legitimate channels and statistical CSI of the eavesdropper channel, an exact expression of secrecy outage probability (SOP) is derived, which acts as a benchmark of the security performance to guide selecting or optimizing parameters of the LED transmitter and the photodiode receiver of NOMA legitimate users. In the multi-eavesdropper case, based on the spatial distribution of legitimate users and eavesdroppers, the SOP is obtained via a stochastic geometry theory, so as to guide the NOMA legitimate users to keep away from the area with high eavesdropper density. For typical parameters of the indoor LED transmitter and the PD receiver, simulation results show that the SOP performance improves with the increasing of LED transmission power or transmission signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in both scenarios. Specifically, in the single eavesdropper case, enlarging the channel condition difference of user groups or deviating the eavesdropper from the given user group can improve the SOP performance, and for a given NOMA legitimate user, the SOP eventually settles around 0.2 while the semiangle at half illuminance of the LED varies between 15 • to 60 • . In the multi-eavesdropper case, we can get a better SOP performance when reducing the eavesdropper density or the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED for a given eavesdropper density.
in adjacent optical attocells, has been regarded as a promising alternative and complementary to RF-based wireless communications [1] - [2] .
By virtue of its inherent broadcast nature, VLC is well suitable for supporting massive connectivity, admitting multiple users to access to the same wireless resource. Conventional orthogonal multiple access (OMA) schemes have already been introduced into VLC, such as code division multiple access (CDMA) [3] , orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) [4] , and space division multiple access (SDMA) [5] . In these OMA schemes, in order to mitigate mutual interference, multiple users are separately allocated to orthogonal wireless resource, which is not yet sufficient to support massive connectivity because of the limited wireless resources.
As a promising technique, non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA), mainly achieved in the power domain, and has recently been proposed to enhance the spectral efficiency for the forthcoming fifth-generation (5G) wireless communication systems [6] [7] [8] [9] . NOMA allows multiple users to share the same time and frequency band by employing superposition coding at the transmitter and successive interference cancellation (SIC) at the receiver. In addition, NOMA can also lead to better performance than OMA in ergodic sum rate [10] , fairness [11] , outage performance [12] and energy efficiency [13] .
In view of the above benefits, NOMA has also been adopted in VLC systems. In [14] , a gain ratio power allocation scheme was presented to enhance the throughput for a downlink NOMA VLC system, and the system sum rate could be further improved by tuning the semi-angle of LED transmitter and the field of view (FOV) of photodiode (PD) receiver. In [15] , a theoretical framework for measuring the performance of NOMA in a downlink VLC system was presented, and the system performance was proved to be mainly associated with the semi-angle of the LED. To realize the user fairness and satisfy the unique intensity constraint for optical modulations, the sum rate was maximized with a logarithmic utility function in [16] . In [17] , NOMA was applied in a VLC system under different channel uncertainty models. The bit error rate performance under perfect channel state information (CSI), noisy CSI, and outdated CSI were successively obtained. To date, most research on NOMA VLC tends to concentrate on the indoor short-range application since high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is usually obtained at the receiver of VLC system in virtue of illuminating requirement.
Like RF-based wireless communication systems, VLC systems are also confronted with security threats due to its inherent broadcast nature. VLC channels are inevitably susceptible to eavesdropping by eavesdroppers or unauthorized users accessing to the same communication area illuminated by the LED transmitter. Typical scenarios for VLC systems suffering security threats include public areas such as shopping malls, meeting rooms, libraries, and aircrafts.
Physical-layer security [18] [19] [20] has been regarded as a promising method to ensure secure transmission over wireless channels, and as a complement to the traditional cryptographic techniques. Existing work on physical-layer security in VLC systems focused mainly on one legitimate user suffering security threats from eavesdroppers. According to the number of eavesdroppers, we can put existing research on VLC physical-layer security into two categories:
1) physical-layer security of a legitimate user in presence of a single eavesdropper. The physical-layer security in VLC systems was raised in [21] for the first time, where a closedform expression for the achievable secrecy rate of a single legitimate user was derived via transmit beamforming technique over a multiple-input single-output (MISO) VLC wiretap channel in the presence of one eavesdropper. Later on, the authors utilized a robust beamforming technique to tackle the worst-case secrecy rate maximization problem under the imperfect CSI of the legitimate user's and eavesdropper's links [22] . In [23] , based on the ill-posed theory, and using the real-valued CSI of VLC channel and chaotic sequences, a chaotic channel determined subcarrier shifting scheme combined with pre-equalization was proposed, and the issue of physical-layer security for a VLC system was modeled as an ill-posed equation, so as to enhance the security performance of the legitimate user without compromising the bit error rate. The secrecy outage performance of the uplink in a hybrid VLC-RF system with light energy harvesting was investigated in [24] , where the single legitimate receiver was assumed to be with finite energy storage.
2) physical-layer security of a legitimate user in presence of multiple eavesdroppers. An artificial noise assisting beamforming scheme was proposed in [25] to optimize the secure transmission strategy from a quality-of-service (QoS) aspect for a MISO VLC system. A scenario was investigated in [26] that multiple eavesdroppers outside the room eavesdrop the information of the single indoor legitimate user through windows, and robust secure beamformers were respectively designed to minimize the total transmit power or to maximize the secrecy rate when the CSI of the eavesdroppers were imperfect due to the change of the geometry of the windows. By considering the randomness of the locations of the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers, the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and the average secrecy capacity were derived with a stochastic geometry method in [27] . Although the title of [28] was the physical-layer security in multiuser VLC networks, only the user at the room center was supposed to be legitimate user, while all other users were supposed to be eavesdroppers, and hence NOMA transmission scheme has not yet been adopted. The SOP of the single legitimate user was analyzed using stochastic geometry by regarding the locations of multiple LED transmitters and multiuser as two two-dimensional, independent and homogeneous Poisson point processes (PPPs).
So far, little research has been developed on the physicallayer security of multiple legitimate users in VLC systems with NOMA. Although the security of multiple legitimate users in VLC systems were investigated in [29] and [30] , however, the schemes that can make full use of NOMA transmission have not been covered in them, and even [30] did not consider the physical-layer security but the encryption security.
On the other hand, in RF-based wireless communication systems, the physical-layer security of multiple legitimate users with NOMA has been extensively studied. For multiple NOMA legitimate users in presence of one eavesdropper, the security performance were investigated by secrecy sum rate [31] , [32] , SOP [33] , [34] , secrecy rate [35] , [36] . For multiple NOMA legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, by employing their spatial distribution and using the stochastic geometry tool, the security performance were evaluated by SOP and secrecy diversity order [37] , or coverage probability and effective secrecy throughput [38] . The physical-layer security technology utilized in these works include precoding [32] , transmit antenna selection [33] , beamforming [35] , [36] , and MIMO [37] , [38] . However, these approaches utilized in RF-based wireless communication systems cannot be directly applied to VLC systems due to the special requirements on the signal from the LED transmitter and on the transmission characteristic of the optical wireless channel.
In view of the above, it is imperative to develop research on the physical-layer security of multiuser VLC systems with NOMA, so as to improve the security performance of VLC systems in multiple access situations and facilitate the secure application of optical wireless communication technology in IoTs.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this work, we investigate the security performance of multiuser VLC systems with NOMA. When eavesdroppers are in the same illuminated area of LED as the downlink NOMA VLC legitimate users, in order to eavesdrop or intercept information to the maximum extent, more than one eavesdropper are often deployed in practical application. We respectively consider a single known eavesdropper scenario and a multi-eavesdropper scenario, and the security performance is investigated by SOP in both scenarios. Both the NOMA legitimate users and the eavesdropper are assumed to receive information with PD receiver. The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: 1) Through analyzing the security performance of multiple NOMA VLC legitimate users in presence of a single eavesdropper with known location, we get the benchmark of the security performance to guide selecting or optimizing the parameters of the LED transmitter and the PD receiver of NOMA legitimate users.
2) In the presence of multiple eavesdroppers with randomly spatial distribution, using the mathematical tool of stochastic geometry, we study the secrecy outage performance in a multiuser VLC system with NOMA, with the aim of guiding the NOMA legitimate users to keep away from the area with high eavesdropper density.
3) Finally, based on typical parameters of indoor LED transmitter and PD receiver, simulation experiments have been made via MATLAB. Simulation results show that in the case of single eavesdropper, the SOP performance of the legitimate users far away from the eavesdropper is superior to the legitimate users close to the eavesdropper. Increasing the LED transmission power and enlarging the channel condition difference of user groups can improve the SOP performance of the NOMA legitimate users. Moreover, for a given NOMA legitimate user the SOP eventually settles around 0.2 while the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED varies between 15 • to 60 • . On the other hand, in the multi-eavesdropper case, reducing either the eavesdropper density or the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED for given eavesdropper density can improve the SOP performance of the NOMA legitimate users.
B. ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the single eavesdropper scenario in a multiuser VLC system with NOMA is investigated, and the SOP is derived with known instantaneous CSI of all the NOMA legitimate channels and known statistical CSI of the single eavesdropper channel, where the multiuser VLC system model and VLC channel characteristics are described in detail. In Section III, a multi-eavesdropper scenario is investigated, and the SOP is obtained by the stochastic geometry tool, which is based on statistical characteristics of signal-to interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) or SNR of different NOMA legitimate users. Numerical results are presented in Section IV to verify the theoretical analysis. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks in Section V.
Notations and Functions: Throughout this paper, the expectation is denoted by E{·}, variance by var {·}, and mod by |·|. The following functions will be used: rect(·) represents a rectangular function. 
II. PHYSICAL-LAYER SECURITY OF NOMA VLC LEGITIMATE USERS IN PRESENCE OF SINGLE EAVESDROPPER A. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The system model used in this scenario includes one LED transmitter, K legitimate users, and an eavesdropper appears at the same illuminated area of LED tries to eavesdrop or intercept the information between LED and legitimate users, as shown in Fig. 1 . The LED transmitter is assumed to be facing vertically downwards and the PD receiver is assumed to be facing vertically upwards. The twodimensional illuminated area of the LED on the ground floor is set to be a circle with a radius of D, and the projection of the LED is assumed to be located at the center of the circle. NOMA VLC legitimate user k has a polar coordinate of (r k , θ k ) for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K }, where r k is the distance between user k and the center of the circle, and θ k is the angle of user k deviates from the polar axis. Similarly the single eavesdropper has a polar coordinate of (r e , θ e ).
In accordance with the NOMA principle, superposition coding is used at the LED transmitter, where the modulated information signals for different users are superposed in power in the electrical domain. To ensure a positive instantaneous optical intensity in the optical domain, a direct current (DC) bias must be added to the LED transmitter to realize electrical-to-optical conversion. The ultimate signal transmitted by the LED transmitter is given by
where I DC represents the DC bias added to the LED transmitter; P E is the total electrical power of all the modulated information signals in the electrical domain; a i represents the power allocation coefficient for the i-th legitimate user; and s i is the modulated information signal intended for the i-th legitimate user, which is assumed to be with zero mean. After going through an optical wireless channel, the optical intensity signal is converted at the PD receivers of the legitimate users into a current signal via photoelectric conversion, and further the constant DC offset is removed in the electrical domain. In general, noise is assumed to be introduced in the electrical domain [1] , [2] . Hence the observation at the receiver of user k in the electrical domain can be given by
where n k is an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and variance σ 2 , h k represents the optical wireless channel coefficient between the LED transmitter and the PD receiver of NOMA legitimate user k. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that all the optical wireless channel power gains between the LED transmitter and PD receiver satisfy 0
According to the NOMA principle, each legitimate user (except the first one) will utilize SIC to recover its signal. Hence, user k is able to recover the signal of user i for i < k and remove it from its own signal, while regards the signal of user i for i > k as interference. Therefore, the SINR of user k employing SIC can be expressed as
where γ k = |h k | 2 ρ and ρ = P E /σ 2 is defined as the transmission SNR of the LED transmitter to the NOMA legitimate user.
Generally the use of SIC at PD receivers will cause additional complexity, which is proportional to the number of users in the same channel. Thus, in practice, each downlink NOMA wireless channel is often restricted to be assigned to two users, which is also beneficial to have a decrease in the error propagation of SIC. It should be noted that the two-user special case of downlink NOMA has been included in the third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution Advanced [39] . In this work, we would also like to focus on the two-user special case and assume that user u and user v are the downlink NOMA legitimate users in the same optical wireless channel and 0 < |h u | 2 ≤ |h v | 2 , where h v is the channel power gain of user v and h u is the channel power gain of user u. According to the NOMA principle, more power will be allocated to user u while less power will be allocated to user v. Meanwhile, the power allocation coefficients should satisfy a u > a v and a 2 u + a 2 v = 1. In this way, user v is able to use SIC technology to decode signal of user u, and remove it from its own signal, while user u does not carry out SIC. Hence, the received SNR of NOMA legiti-
The achievable rate of user v and user u can be respectively given by
Because the eavesdropper is generally silent or concealed and it will not actively feedback its instantaneous CSI to the LED transmitter or legitimate users, the legitimate users will be inevitably unaware of any knowledge about the eavesdropper. From the legitimate users' perspective, the worst-case assumption is usually adopted that the passive eavesdropper is aware of the decoding orders and VOLUME 6, 2018 the power allocation coefficients. Furthermore, the conclusions derived under such a worst-case assumption can be used as a fundamental security performance benchmark. It also should be noted that such assumption has been widely adopted in the previous study on the physicallayer security in NOMA RF-based wireless communication systems [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] . Hence, the achievable data rate of the single eavesdropper can be written as
where the maximum SNR achieved by the eavesdropper is Q e and Q e = γ e |a v | 2 , where γ e = |h e | 2 ρ e , and ρ e = P E /σ 2 e represents the transmission SNR of the LED transmitter to the eavesdropper.
B. VLC CHANNEL CHARACTERISTICS
In the optical wireless IM/DD channel, useful information is carried by the intensity of the light signal radiated from the LED. Usually the light from the LED is assumed to be concentrated and filtered successively by an optical concentrator and filter in front of the PD receiver at each legitimate user. Although the received signals reaching the PD receiver include not only the line-of-sight (LOS) component but also the diffuse component, however, it has been demonstrated that even the strongest diffuse component was at least 7 dB lower than the weakest LOS component [40] . Hence in this paper it is assumed that only the LOS path exists and the diffuse component is negligible. The DC gain [1, 2] of the IM/DD channel for user k (k ∈{u, v}) can be described as
where we assume that the LED transmitter works in a generalized Lambertian radiation pattern, and φ represents the angle of irradiance with respect to the normal of LED transmitter plane and correspondingly ϕ is the angle of incidence with respect to the normal of PD receiver plane, as shown in Fig. 2 ; the transmission distance between the LED transmitter and PD receiver is d; and m is the order of Lambertian radiation with m = −ln2/ln(cosφ 1/2 ) where φ 1/2 is denoted as the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED. For example, if ϕ 1/2 = 60 • , then m = 1. rect(·) represents a rectangular function, in which ϕ 1/2 is the FOV of PD receiver. If ϕ k > ϕ 1/2 for user k (k ∈{u, v}), then the PD receiver cannot receive any light from the LED transmitter, and hence h k = 0; g oc is the gain of the optical concentrator and g oc (ϕ) = n 2 /sin 2 (ϕ 1/2 ), where n is the refractive index of the optical concentrator utilized at the PD receiver front-end; g of is the coefficient of optical filter; the parameters S and η are respectively the effective detecting area and responsivity of the PD receiver.
For the channel of NOMA legitimate user k(k ∈ {u, v}), there always exists
where L is the vertical distance between the LED transmitter and the center of the circle, d k is the transmission distance between the LED transmitter and the PD receiver of user k, as shown in Fig. 1 . In this way, the DC channel coefficient of the NOMA legitimate user can be simplified as
where
Given the vertical distance L, the DC channel coefficient h k of the NOMA legitimate user is mainly affected by large-scale fading (i.e., the path loss (r 2 k + L 2 )
, where m is the order of Lambertian radiation of the LED). All the VLC channels of the legitimate user are assumed to be independent and their instantaneous CSI are known to the LED transmitter.
However, for the channel of the eavesdropper, g e = Sηg oc (ϕ e )g of (ϕ e )/2π is often unknown to the LED transmitter since the LED does not know the type of concentrator or filter used by the eavesdropper, and even the LED is not aware of the presence of the eavesdropper. Therefore, the instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper, i.e., h e = g e (m + 1) L m+1 /(r 2 e + L 2 ) (m+3)/2 , is generally unknown to the LED transmitter. In this paper, g e is assumed to be a Gaussian distribution, in the meanwhile, h e also suffers from the large-scale fading i.e., the path loss (r 2 e + L 2 )
. Hence the average channel power gain E |h e | 2 of the eavesdropper can be expressed as
It is clear that if the indoor location of the eavesdropper is previously known, the statistics average channel power gain E |h e | 2 of the eavesdropper can often be obtained from the distance between the LED transmitter and the eavesdropper. In the ideal case the physical-layer security should be achieved without knowing any CSI of the eavesdropper [41] , even the statistics of the eavesdropper's channel. Unfortunately, this is not achievable in fact for most of the physicallayer security problems in wireless communication systems. Generally, the statistics CSI [34] [35] [36] [37] of the eavesdropper's channel is assumed to be available.
C. SOP PERFORMANCE
Generally, both secrecy capacity and SOP [42] [43] [44] can be utilized to measure the security performance of wireless communication systems. The secrecy capacity is suitable for the system with low time delay requirements, while the secrecy outage probability is necessary to measure the security performance of the system with high time delay requirements, especially in the emerging 5G wireless communication systems [45] .
In the following, we make the block fading assumption, in which the fading coefficients remain constant over one block and change to another realization in the next block in a stationary manner. Moreover, the block length is large enough such that the employment of the capacity-achieving coding over one block can cause very small error probability. Additionally, the block length of the legitimate users' channel is the same as that of the eavesdropper's channel. Hence, in view of the security of multiuser VLC system with NOMA, the secrecy rate of user u and user v can be separately expressed as
where [x] + = max{x,0}. An outage event occurs when the secrecy rate of user k (k ∈{u, v}) is lower than the target secrecy rate, which can be expressed as
where the notation P(x) means the probability of the occurrence of event x, and R th is the predefined target secrecy rate for each of the two NOMA legitimate user. Theorem 1: Assuming that the LED transmitter knows the instantaneous CSI of all the NOMA legitimate users while only knows the statistical CSI of the single eavesdropper, and the eavesdropper has very powerful detection and decoding capability, then the SOP of NOMA legitimate user v is given by
The SOP of user v can be calculated by
Substituting h e into γ e = |h e | 2 ρ e and after a series of arrangement, we can get γ e = g 2 e γ e , where γ e = E |h e | 2 ρ e is assumed to be known. Then, the SOP of user v is written as P so,v = P A <γ e g 2 e . Since g e ∼ N (0, 1), then g 2 e obey the Chi-square distribution with a degree of freedom of 1, i.e. χ 2 (1), thus the probability density function (PDF) of g 2 e can be given by
In this way, the SOP of user v can be given by
where (16) follows from substituting the PDF of g 2 e . Let x = y/2, we get P so,v = 
Then using
where (x) is the probability integral function, we will get Theorem 2: Assuming that the LED knows the instantaneous CSI of all NOMA legitimate users while only knows the statistical CSI of the eavesdropper, and the single eavesdropper has very powerful detection and decoding capability, then the SOP of NOMA legitimate user u is given by
where B =
andγ e = E |h e | 2 ρ e . Proof: The SOP of user u can be calculated by
Let B =
, and applying the same approach as above, we can obtain the SOP of user u. The proof is complete. VOLUME 6, 2018
III. PHYSICAL-LAYER SECURITY OF NOMA VLC LEGITIMATE USERS IN PRESENCE OF MULTI-EAVESDROPPER
In this section, we will investigate the physical-layer security performance of a multiuser VLC system with NOMA, where there exist two NOMA legitimate users and multiple eavesdroppers. The security performance is greatly influenced by the spatial distributions of both the NOMA users and eavesdroppers.
The top view of the multiuser and multi-eavesdropper VLC system with NOMA is shown in Fig. 3 , where the illuminated area of the LED attached to the room ceiling is treated as a circle on the ground floor with a radius of D and the projection point of the LED is assumed to be located at the center of the circle. Meanwhile, the NOMA legitimate users are uniformly distributed in this circle, while the randomly roaming multiple eavesdroppers in this circle is modeled as a homogeneous PPP, which is denoted by e with an eavesdropper density of λ e . 
A. STATISTICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SINR OR SNR
Lemma 1: Assuming that the locations of the NOMA legitimate users obey uniform distribution within the disc of Fig. 3 , the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the SNR of NOMA legitimate user v with high VLC channel power gain is given by
Proof: Since the SNR of user v with high VLC channel power gain is Q v = γ v |a v | 2 , where γ v = |h v | 2 ρ. Then, the CDF of the SNR of user v can be expressed as
where F |h v | 2 (·) is the CDF of the ordered channel power gain for user v.
Since the locations of the NOMA legitimate users obey uniform distribution, the PDF of the horizontal separation of user k from the LED transmitter is f r k (r) = 2r/D 2 , where r k (k ∈{u, v}) is the distance between user k and the center of the circle. Assuming y = x ρ|a v | 2 , and using order statistics [47] and the conclusion of equation (15) in [15] , we can express the PDF of the ordered channels as
where the total number of the NOMA legitimate user is described by K and the ordered channel power gain satisfies
Since in this paper only two NOMA legitimate users are considered, thereforeK is set as 2 and the order is set as u = 1, v = 2.F |h v | 2 (y) is the CDF of the unordered channel, which can be written as
andf |h v | 2 (y) is the corresponding PDF of the unordered channel, which can be written as
By taking the integration of the PDF f |h v | 2 (y) of the ordered channel power gain, we can obtain the CDF F |h v | 2 (y) of the ordered channel power gain of user v, which can be expressed as
where κ min is the minimum of the channel power gain |h v | 2 of user v for its location being r v = D. Hence we have
. Correspondingly, we can obtain the maximum of the channel power gain |h v | 2 of user v for its location being r v = 0, i.e.,
We have
By applying [46, eq. (3.196. 3)], i.e.,
, for b > a, Re µ > 0, Re v > 0, we obtain the CDF F |h v | 2 (y) of the ordered channel power gain of userv, which can be expressed as (28), we can get
Hence the CDF of the ordered channel power gain of user v can be expressed as
Finally, substituting y = x ρ|a v | 2 into (29), we get the CDF of the SNR of user v in (19) . The proof is complete.
Lemma 2: Assuming that the locations of the NOMA legitimate users obey uniform distribution within the disc of Fig. 3 , the CDF of the SINR of user u with low VLC channel power gain is given by (30) , as shown at the top of the next page.
Proof: Since the SINR of user u with low VLC channel power gain is
, where γ u = |h u | 2 P E /σ 2 = |h u | 2 ρ, then the CDF of the SINR of user u can be expressed as
By applying the same approach above, we can obtain the CDF of the ordered channel power gain of user u, which can be expressed as
is the CDF of the unordered channel, which is given bỹ
Finally, substituting y =
and (33) into (32), then substituting the obtained results into (31), we get the CDF of the SINR of user u in (30) . The proof is complete.
Lemma 3: Assuming that the locations of the eavesdroppers within the disc of Fig. 3 obey the homogeneous PPP, the CDF of the most detrimental eavesdropper is given by (34) , as shown at the top of the next page, where = 1/ ρ e (m + 1) L m+1 2 |a v | 2 , and the incomplete gamma function is ϒ (α, x) = x 0 e −t t α−1 dt. Proof: The multiple eavesdroppers are modeled as a homogeneous PPP denoted by e with a density of λ e . All the eavesdroppers are assumed to have powerful SIC capabilities, and the most detrimental eavesdropper is the one which has the highest SINR, i.e., Q e = ρ e |a v | 2 max e∈ e ,r e ≤D |h e | 2 , where any eavesdropper e (e ∈ e ) is located in the circle with a radius of D and its polar coordinate is (r e , θ e ), and the distance r e between the eavesdropper e and the center of the circle should be no more than D, that is to say r e ≤ D. All the eavesdroppers are assumed to be statistically independent and with the same noise variance σ 2 e , ρ e = P E /σ 2 e is the transmission SNR of the eavesdroppers.
The CDF of the most detrimental eavesdropper can be expressed as
where (35a) follows from the similar means which is used in [37] and in the indoor two-dimensional ground floor there exists r e ∈ R 2 and r e ≤ D, where R 2 represents the set of two-dimensional real-valued numbers; (35b) holds by letting y = r 2 + L 2 , and since r By taking the first-order partial derivative of the CDF of the most detrimental eavesdropper in (36) with respect to x, VOLUME 6, 2018 = x α−1 e −x , we can derive the PDF of the most detrimental eavesdropper, which is given by (37) as shown at the top of this page, where
B. SOP PERFORMANCE Theorem 3: Assuming that the locations of the two NOMA legitimate users in the two-dimensional ground room obey uniform distribution, while the locations of multiple eavesdroppers obey the homogeneous PPP, the SOP of user v is given by (38) , as shown at the top of this page.
Proof: In this part, we examine the SOP performance under the condition that the connection between the LED transmitter and legitimate users can be established. Therefore, the SIC can be successfully performed at user v. The SOP of user v can be calculated as
Upon using the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, substituting (21) and (37) into (39), after some further arrangement, we can get the SOP of user v. The proof is complete.
Theorem 4: Assuming that the locations of the two NOMA legitimate users in the two-dimensional ground room obey uniform distribution, while the locations of multiple eavesdroppers obey the homogeneous PPP, the SOP of user u is given by (40) , as shown at the top of the next page. 
Proof: Applying the similar approach in the proof of Theorem 3, we get
Note that the point of demarcation of the piece-wise function of F Q u in (30) is |a u | 2 /|a v | 2 , and comparing it with 2 2R th (1 + x) − 1 in (41), we can obtain a new point of demarcation 1 2 2R th |a v | 2 − 1 for the function in (41) . Then, (41) can be further expressed as
After some arrangement, we can get the SOP of user u shown in (40) . The proof is complete.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we validate the SOP performance of two NOMA legitimate users via MATLAB for the proposed two scenarios: 1) a single eavesdropper with determined position; 2) randomly roaming multiple eavesdroppers with a spatial distribution of homogeneous PPP. The parameters used in both scenarios for the LED transmitter, and the PD receiver equipped in the front-end of the legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers are listed in Table 1 .
A. SOP OF THE NOMA LEGITIMATE USER IN PRESENCE OF A SINGLE EAVESDROPPER WITH DETERMINED POSITION
To evaluate the security performance of certain user group versus different occurring positions of the eavesdropper, we compare two situations for the occurring position of the single eavesdropper, one is with a polar coordinate of (0.9 m, 90 • ) which is close to the legitimate user and the other is with a polar coordinate of (1.7 m, 90 • ) which is far away from the legitimate user. The parameters setting for different occurring positions of the eavesdropper versus the total LED electrical power are shown in Table 2 . Fig. 4 depicts the SOP performance of the two NOMA legitimate users (called as a user group) for different occurring positions of the eavesdropper versus the total LED electrical power. It can be seen that for the given user group (r v = 0.4 m, r u = 0.5 m), when the eavesdropper (r e = 0.9 m) is close to the legitimate user, the SOP of legitimate users is high, while the eavesdropper (r e = 1.7 m) is far away from the legitimate user, the SOP of legitimate users is low, that is to say, the SOP performance of the legitimate users far away from the eavesdropper is superior to the legitimate users close to the eavesdropper. This is because the rate difference between the legitimate channel (main channel) and the eavesdropping channel is weakened when the eavesdropper is close to the legitimate user, making it easier for eavesdropping. Furthermore, for the same determinate user group versus any kind of eavesdropper, the SOP performance of the legitimate users with high channel power gain is always better than that of the legitimate users with low channel power gain. It is due to the fact that the legitimate user with high channel power gain has strong SIC capability. It can also be seen from Fig. 4 that increasing the LED transmission power can improve the SOP performance of all the legitimate users. This is because the channel capacity of the main channel increases VOLUME 6, 2018 with the LED transmission power, which enlarges the rate difference between the main channel and the eavesdropper channel.
With the location of the eavesdropper (r e = 1.7 m) being unchanged, the SOP performance versus two different channel conditions of user groups are evaluated, which is shown in Fig. 5, where significantly different channel condition is always superior to that of the user group with similar channel condition, that is to say, more difference of the channel condition leads to better SOP performance. Specifically, in user group 2 for user v with high channel power gain, the outage event never occurs. This is due to not only the fact that the eavesdropper is far from the legitimate user v, but also the fact that the user v with high channel power gain can often achieve a higher individual date rate with NOMA [48] .
Next, we investigate the SOP performance versus the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED for two NOMA VLC legitimate users in the presence of a single eavesdropper. When the LED has a semi-angle at half illuminance of 15 degrees, the coverage of its optical beam will achieve a maximum radius of 2.15 × arctan(15 • ) = 0.5505 m in the two-dimensional ground floor. However for the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED being 60 degrees, the maximum beam coverage is a radius of 2.15 × arctan(60 • ) = 1.7382 m. Therefore, During the simulation experiment, we set the polar coordinate (r v , θ v ) of the NOMA legitimate user with higher channel power gain as (0.4 m, 120 • ), while the polar coordinate (r u , θ u ) of the NOMA legitimate user with lower channel power gain as (0.5 m, 150 • ), so that both of the legitimate users can receive the information from the LED transmitter since the distance between them and the projection of the LED is always smaller than 0.5505 m, and this is why we had chosen the user group (r v = 0.4 m, r u = 0.5 m) in the previous simulation experiment. In the meanwhile, in order to observe the influence of the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED on the SOP performance, we change the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED from 15 • to 60 • .
It can be seen from Fig. 6 that, with the location of the eavesdropper being r e = 0.55 m, which is smaller than 0.5505 m (no matter how the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED changes, the single eavesdropper is always in the same illuminated region as the two NOMA legitimate users), the secrecy outage happens to both the user with high channel power gain and the user with low channel power gain, and the SOP of the two NOMA legitimate users eventually settles around 0.2 while the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED varies between 15 • to 60 • . However, when the single eavesdropper is relatively far from the NOMA legitimate user with its location being r e = 1 m, the secrecy outage event never occurs for the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED being smaller than 30 • , that is because the eavesdropper does not occur at the same illuminated region as the two NOMA legitimate users, hence the eavesdropper cannot receive any information from the LED, and therefore cannot certainly eavesdrop any information. On the other hand, for the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED being larger than 30 • , increasing the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED will cause the SOP of the two users eventually to be smaller than 0.2. It is verified again that the SOP performance of the legitimate users far away from the eavesdropper (r e = 1 m) is superior to the legitimate users close to the eavesdropper (r e = 0.55 m).
B. SOP OF THE NOMA LEGITIMATE USER IN PRESENCE OF RANDOMLY ROAMING MULTIPLE EAVESDROPPERS WITH A SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF HOMOGENEOUS PPP
In the following, the security performance in the multiuser VLC system with NOMA in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers will be evaluated. Fig. 7 plots the SOP performance of user u and user v versus different densities of eavesdroppers for various transmission SNRs. The density range of the randomly roaming multiple eavesdroppers is assumed to be in 10 −2 ∼10 1 . It can be seen from Fig. 7 that the SOP decreases with the density of the eavesdroppers, this is because reducing the density of eavesdroppers can enlarge the rate difference between the main channel and the eavesdropping channel, so that it can improve the security performance of legitimate users. Another observation from Fig. 7 is that with a given transmission SNR, user v always gets a lower SOP than user u, and this is because user v with high channel power gain has stronger SIC capability and lower path loss compared with user u with low channel power gain. It can also be seen from Fig. 7 that for a given user, increasing the transmission SNR, e.g., from 60dB to 80dB, can improve the SOP performance and it is due to the fact that increasing the transmission SNR can enlarge the rate difference between the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper channel, which is equivalent to degrade the channel conditions of the eavesdroppers. Fig. 8 depicts the SOP of user u and user v versus the semiangle at half illuminance of the LED when the density of the eavesdroppers is 0.1. It can be seen from Fig. 8 that when the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED is small, the SOP performance of the legitimate users is good, which is due to the same fact as above that the LED has a narrow optical beam and good signal confinement in this situation, thus the information is not easy to leak. However, this situation will greatly limit the flexibility and mobility of the legitimate users. Again it is seen from Fig. 8 that for a given user, increasing the transmission SNR, e.g., from 60dB to 80dB, can reduce the SOP. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we specifically consider the physical-layer security issue in a downlink NOMA multiuser VLC system, where the security performance of the NOMA VLC legitimate users in presence of a single eavesdropper and in presence of a multiple eavesdropper have been respectively taken into account. In the single eavesdropper case, an exact expression of the SOP is obtained under the condition that the instantaneous CSI of all the legitimate channels and the statistical CSI of the single eavesdropper channel are known which are based on the thorough analysis of characteristics of the optical wireless IM/DD channel. In the multi-eavesdropper case, we obtain the SOP by using the theoretical tool of stochastic geometry, under the assumption that the legitimate users are uniformly distributed and the spatial distribution of the eavesdroppers is a homogeneous PPP. For typical parameters of the indoor LED transmitter and the PD receiver, simulation results show that in the case of single eavesdropper, the SOP performance of the legitimate users far away from the eavesdropper is superior to the legitimate users close to the eavesdropper. Both the increasing of the LED transmission power and the enlarging of the channel condition difference of user groups can improve the SOP performance of the NOMA legitimate users. Moreover, for a given NOMA legitimate user the SOP eventually settles around 0.2 while the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED varies between 15 • to 60 • . On the other hand, in the multi-eavesdropper case, reducing the eavesdropper density or the semi-angle at half illuminance of the LED for a given eavesdropper density can improve the SOP performance of the NOMA legitimate users. These results will provide a valuable theoretical basis and important practice instruction significance for various applications of physical-layer security techniques in multiuser visible light communication systems with NOMA.
